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THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF TEMPORARY JOBS IN SPAIN:  
A THEORETICAL-EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
 
Elena Casquel and Antoni Cunyat 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes the dynamics of temporary jobs in a labor market 
characterized by worker heterogeneity and employment protection. We argue that 
segmentation in the labor market arises endogenously from the heterogeneity of 
workers. In this sense, we show the existence of two opposite dynamics of temporary 
contracts: for some type of workers temporary jobs act as stepping stones to permanent 
jobs, whereas other type of workers get stuck in temporary jobs. Using microdata on 
labor market transitions for Spain, we test and confirm the model's prediction obtaining 
that for more educated workers temporary contracts serve as stepping stone. By 
contrast, young workers, women, less educated workers and ''bad history'' workers seem 
to experiment a penalty and temporary contracts seem to be dead-end jobs. Moreover, 
we test the ''screening device hypothesis'' by introducing unobserved heterogenity. We 
obtain that the transition into permanency depends exclusively on the observed 
characteristics of workers (education, past labor history, etc). 
Keywords: temporary contracts, permanent contracts, unemployment, transitions. 
JEL classification: J63, J64 
 
RESUMEN 
En el presente trabajo se analiza el papel jugado por los contratos temporales 
como puerta de entrada a contratos permanentes y otros estados utilizando una muestra 
extraída de las cinco primeras olas del Panel Europeo de Hogares. Nuestro principal 
resultado consiste en que hay determinados colectivos de trabajadores que permanecen 
“atrapados” en contratos temporales. Concretamente, trabajadores con menores niveles 
educativos no sólo tienen menos probabilidades de conseguir un contrato permanente 
sino que además es más probable que acaben desempleados o en otro contrato temporal. 
Mujeres y trabajadores jóvenes tienen una alta probabilidad de acabar desempleados. El 
pasado laboral de los empleados también juega un papel importante en todas las 
transiciones. En este sentido, aquellos trabajadores que hayan experimentado desempleo 
de larga duración es muy probable que acaben otra vez desempleados. 
Palabras clave: contratos temporales, contratos permanentes, desempleo, transición. 
Clasificación JEL: J63, J64 
 1I n t r o d u c t i o n .
This paper analyzes the dynamics of temporary jobs in a labor market char-
acterized by worker heterogeneity and employment protection.
The motivation for this work is the following. A better understanding
of where temporary contracts led when they expire can shed some light on
the actual beneﬁts and costs of labor market ﬂexibility. In this sense, there
are two contradictory hypotheses. One view considers the bridging function
of temporary contracts, suggesting that they can serve as an entry route to
permanency. The second one suggests that temporary contracts can become
dead-end jobs without any good prospect.
In this paper, we show the existence of two opposite dynamics of tem-
porary contracts. We argue that there is no need to discriminate between
these two alternatives, since both coexist in the labor market, that is, it is
possible a diﬀerent use of temporary contracts for diﬀerent types of workers.
In the theoretical section of the paper we develop a matching model built
on Blanchard and Landier (2002) and Wasmer (1999) in a labor market with
heterogeneous workers and symmetric information, which suggests the ex-
istence of two opposite dynamics of temporary contracts: for some type of
workers ("high-productivity workers") temporary jobs act as stepping stones
to permanent jobs, whereas other type of workers ("low-productivity work-
ers") get stuck in temporary jobs. We characterize a labor market in which
ﬁrms, knowing workers’ type when matching, hire workers in temporary con-
tracts and, then, if the match turns out to be good (which is an exogenous
event), they have to decide whether they keep them in a permanent job or
they ﬁre them. Therefore, two conditions are required for the conversion of
a temporary contract into permanent. First, ﬁrms are matched with some
speciﬁc type of worker. Second, the match turns out to be of good quality.
It is important to note that ﬁrms know the type of the worker they are
matched to before hiring. Hence, they are not using the temporary contract
as a screening device to obtain information about worker’s type. On the
other hand, workers of diﬀerent types enter the labor market in the same
conditions, with a temporary contract. Therefore, we are not assuming an
exogenous dual labor market, where some workers are in the core segments
of the labor market and other in the peripheral segments. Segmentation in
our framework arises endogenously from the heterogeneity of workers. Other
novel argument is in place here. Firms use temporary jobs with some type
of workers as a waiting device until they are matched with some speciﬁc
type of worker.
The empirical analysis of the paper tests the prediction of two oppositedynamics for diﬀerent type of workers, focusing on Spain. A study of Spain
is especially compelling. First, as in the theoretical model, the Spanish la-
bor market is a "two-tier system", in which ﬁring costs only apply to the
termination of permanent contracts. Secondly, Spain provides a fascinating
case of study since the share of temporary contracts not only is the highest
in the OECD but also remains highly persistent above 30 per cent since
the last decade. We test the theoretical model analyzing the transition from
temporary to permanency, to unemployment and to temporary to other ﬁrm
by means of a "competing-risks model". We expect that "high-productive
workers" make integrate1 transitions and have less probability to go to unem-
ployment or temporary contracts. By contrast, "low-productivity workers"
make transitions to unemployment or to other ﬁrms under a temporary con-
tract. We adress these issues using a sample of temporary contracts drawn
for the ﬁrst ﬁve waves of the European Panel Household Survey (EPHS) for
Spain.
Our results conﬁrm that two opposite dynamics of temporary contracts
seem to emerge. We obtain that for more educated workers temporary
contracts serve as stepping stone. By contrast, workers who have a "bad
history" seem to get stuck in temporary contracts. Moreover, the results
suggest that workers’ characteristics play a key role in the transition to
unemployment. In this sense, youngsters, women, less educated workers and
”bad history” workers seem to experiment a penalty. Therefore, for these
groups of workers temporary contracts seem to be dead-end jobs. These
results reinforce the existence of a ”precariousness” trap for some kind of
workers.
Finally, we test the ”screening device hypothesis” by introducing unob-
served heterogeneity. Our results indicate that the transition into perma-
nency depends exclusively on the observed characteristics of workers (edu-
cation, past labor history, etc.), which suggests that temporary contracts
are not used as a ”screening device”, that is, conversion into permanency
does not depend on unobservable characteristics of individuals (ability, pref-
erences, etc.).
Our empirical work is closely related to Gath (2003), in the sense that
she tries to integrate both hypothesis. Booth et al (2002) also pay attention
to the fact that the use of contracts depends on workers characteristics.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we survey the related
literature. In Section 3 we introduce the theoretical model and their re-
1We consider integrate transitions as transitions from a temporary contract to a per-
manent one.sults. Section 4 empirically tests the existence of two opposite dynamics of
temporary contracts. Finally, Secion 5 concludes and summarizes.
2 Literature review
There is a growing literature on temporary contracts and many theoreti-
cal approaches to analyze the eﬀects of temporary contracts on the labor
market2. The appropriate framework to analyse the dynamics of temporary
contracts is a search and matching model a la’ Pissarides extended to the
case in which permanent and temporary contracts coexist. To the best of
our knowledge there is no work available analysing this issue in a match-
ing framework. In Blanchard and Landier (2002), Cahuc and Postel-Vinay
(2002) and Dolado et al (2004) temporary contracts have been accounted
for in a matching model a la’ Pissarides focusing on the eﬀects of partial re-
forms on the conversion of temporary contracts on permanent ones. On the
other hand, Wasmer (1999), in the same framework focuses on the eﬀects of
exogenous productivity growth on the tightness of labor market.
With respect to the empirical literature, there are some new works that
analyze these dynamics. They mainly try to test the stepping stone hy-
pothesis. Toharia (1996), using the Labor Force Survey (LFS) observes that
transition probabilies from temporary to permanent depend on workers and
vacancy characteristics. Alba-Ramirez (1998) also uses the LFS for Spain
and ﬁnds evidence of a segmented labour market where the weaker workers
a r em o r ep r o n et op e r s i s ti ns h o r t - t e r me mployment relationships. Finally,
Guell and Petrongolo (2003), using microdata obtained from the LFS, try
to test if temporary contracts are used as a screening device or, by contrast,
as a cheaper option.
Zijl et al (2004), using a multi-spell model also test the "stepping stone"
hypothesis obtaining evidence that temporary jobs serve as stepping stones
for unemployed workers. Moreover, Gagliarducci (2003) shows that in Italy,
temporary contracts are used as a "cheaper option".
Our work is closely related to Gath (2003). She argued that ﬁrms’ use
of temporary contracts depends on the type of worker, because probatory
contracts are too expensive for ”less-skilled workers”. Morever, Booth et al
(2002) also pay attention to the fact that the use of temporary contracts
depends on workers characteristics and some ethnic minorities and women
are especially aﬀected.
2See Dolado et al (2002) for a brief survey.3 The Theoretical model
The purpose of the model is to formalize in the most simple way the follow-
ing idea: the segmentation in the labor market arises endogenously from the
heterogeneity of workers. In this sense, two opposite dynamics emerge: tem-
porary contracts are for some types of workers stepping-stone jobs, whereas
for others, they are dead-end jobs.
In characterizing the labor market, we think of it as one in which ﬁrms
hire workers in temporary jobs and, then, they have to decide whether
they keep them in a permanent job or they ﬁre them. In this sense, our
setup shares some similarities with, on the one hand, Blanchard and Landier
(2002) and, on the other hand, Wasmer (1999).
Contrary to these authors, a key point for our analysis is to allow for
worker heterogeneity. In this framework, ﬁrms’s decision is simple, they can:
(i) Never convert temporary jobs into permanent no matter the type of
worker the ﬁrm is matched to.
(ii) Always convert temporary jobs into permanent no matter the type of
worker the ﬁrm is matched to.
(iii) Convert temporary jobs into permanent only for some type of workers.
The ﬁrst one implies that a ﬁrm always ﬁlls a vacant with a temporary
job regardless of the worker the ﬁrm is matched to. The last one implies
that temporary jobs are used as a waiting device until the ﬁrm is matched
with some speciﬁct y p eo fw o r k e r .
We construct this model and consider its implications for some types
of workers in a world characterized by a heterogenous workforce. Assume a
continuous-time model in which workers live forever and are risk neutral. To
s i m p l i f y ,w es u p p o s et h a tt h e r ea r et w ot y p e so fw o r k e r s( A-type and B-type
workers), which diﬀer in their productivity only if the match turns out to
be good and ﬁrms know the workers’s type3 before hiring. Speciﬁcally, the
mass of A-type workers is µ,a n dt h em a s so fB - t y p ew o r k e r si s1 − µ.
The number of ﬁrms is endogenously determined. Each ﬁrm oﬀers one
job, which costs c to set up and it is either vacant or ﬁlled. In the former case,
the ﬁrm is actively engaged in hiring at a cost k. We assume that when a new
3In this sense, we are ruling out the existence of private information about the worker’s
productivity. Hence, worker’s types are not deﬁned as usual in models with private infor-
mation. Here, the type of a worker is simply a class of worker.ﬁrm is created, a temporary job4 is oﬀered which starts with productivity
y, regardless of the type of worker the ﬁrm is matched5. Productivity then
changes with instantaneous probability λ. The new level of productivity can
take two values. With probability p, it changes to a low productivity level
such that the match is destroyed and the position is vacant again. With
probability 1 − p, it changes to a new value yi, i ∈ {A,B}, which depends
o nt h et y p eo fw o r k e rt h eﬁrm is matched to. When productivity changes
from y to yi,t h eﬁrm can decide either to lay oﬀ the worker (and, hence,
hire a new worker in a temporary job), or keep him in a permanent job.
In the latter case, the permanent job can be destroyed with instantaneous
probability6 φ < λ, in which case there exist ﬁring costs, f, which are pure
waste.
Unemployed workers and vacancies are assumed to meet each other ran-
domly according to a conventional function m(v,u) with constant returns
to scale, where v and u denote, respectively, the masses of job vacancies
and of unemployed workers. We denote the arrival rate for workers as h(θ),
where θ = v
u is the labor market tightness. We assume that h  (θ) > 0 and
that lim
θ→0
h(θ)=0 . We suppose that A and B-type workers meet vacancies
at the same rate. Similarly, vacancies meet unemployed workers at the rate
l(θ). We assume that l  (θ) < 0 and that lim
θ→0
l(θ)=∞.L e t η denote the
fraction of the unemployed workers who are A-type, then the arrival rate
for vacancies of A-type workers is ηl(θ).
When a matched is formed, the ﬁrm and worker divide the surplus of the
match according to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. The worker’s
share of the surplus is exogenous and denoted by β ∈ (0,1).
In deriving the asset value equations we use the following notation. Let
Ui be the value of an unemployed worker of type i ∈ {A,B},a n dV the
value of a vacancy. Jij the value of a type of contract j ∈ {T,P} ﬁlled with
aw o r k e ro ft y p ei. Similarly, let Wij denote the value of employment for a
worker of type i in a contract of type j. The surplus of a match between
4Blanchard and Landier (2002) refer to them as entry-level jobs.
5The idea is that at the beginning of any employer-employee relationship all workers
start in the same conditions. Only if the match turns out to be good, A-type workers will
perform better for the ﬁrm. This is a simplifying assumption which can be easily relaxed
without aﬀecting substantially the results.
6This assumption was introduced by Wasmer (1999). The interpretation is that tem-
porary contracts are terminated either by destruction or due to reaching the maximum



























yA  y  yBworker of type i and a job with contract of type j,w i l lt h e nb eg i v e nb y
SiT = WiT + JiT − Ui − V (1)
SiP = WiP + JiP − Ui − V + f (2)
Hence, the wage wij is given by the Nash Bargaining solution of
β (JiT − V )=( 1 − β)(WiT − Ui) (3)
β (JiP − V + f)=( 1 − β)(WiP − Ui) (4)
Finally, we assume that the common discount rate of workers and ﬁrms
is r. Moreover, the unemployed workers earn a ﬂow income z<y .W en o w
develop expressions for the asset value equations.
First, the value to a ﬁrm of employment of a worker of type i on a job
with temporary contract is given by:
rJiT = y − wiT + λ[p(V − JiT)+( 1− p)(max(V,JiP) − JiT)] (5)
and for a permanent contract:
rJiP = yi − wiP + φ(V − JiP − f) (6)
Next, the value to a worker of type i of employment on a job with
temporary contract is:
rWiT = wiT + λ[p(Ui − WiT)+( 1− p){max(Ui,W iP) − WiT}] (7)
and for a permanent contract:
rWiP = wiP + φ(Ui − WiP) (8)
The value of unemployment for a worker of type i is:
rUi = z + h(θ)(WiT − Ui) (9)
Finally, the value of a vacancy is given by:
rV = −k + ηl(θ)(JAT − V )+( 1− η)l(θ)(JBT − V ) (10)3.1 Equilibrium
A steady-state equilibrium in this model is a collection of three variables
{θ,u,η} that satisfy the following conditions:
(i) ﬁrm vacancy creation satisﬁes free entry condition
(ii) the ﬂow of A-type workers into and out of unemployment is equal, and
the same for B-type workers.
As a previous step, to solve for equilibrium we obtain the surplus of the
diﬀerent job-worker matchings.
>From (1), (2), (6), (8), and (9), the surplus of a job in a permanent
contract occupied by a worker of type i ∈ {A,B}, SiP,i sg i v e nb y :
SiP =






and the surplus of a job in a temporary contract occupied by a worker
of type i, SiT,i sg i v e nb y :
SiT =
y − z − rc− λ(1 − p)f
r + λ + βh(θ)
+
λ(1 − p)
r + λ + βh(θ)
(max{f,SiP}) (12)
Applying condition (i), free entry condition, to (10) we obtain:
k +( r + l(θ))c = ηl(θ)JAT +( 1− η)l(θ)JBT (13)
Using (3), JiT =( 1− β)SiT. (13) can be rewritten as:
k +( r + l(θ))c
l(θ)
=( 1− β)[ηSAT +( 1− η)SBT] (14)
3.2 Segmentation Equilibrium
We focus on the equilibrium in which ﬁrms convert temporary jobs into
permanent only when matched with a A-type worker. We refer to this case
as equilibrium with segmentation.
This equilibrium exists if match between a ﬁrm and a worker is only
proﬁtable under a permanent contract with a A-type worker, that is, SBP <
f<S AP. In which case (12), can be rewritten as:SBT =
y − z − rc
r + λ + βh(θ)
(15)
SAT =
y − z − rc− λ(1 − p)f
r + λ + βh(θ)
+
λ(1 − p)
r + λ + βh(θ)
SAP (16)
>From (11), (15) and (16), free entry condition, (14) in a segmentation
equilibrium is given by:


















Condition (ii) in a segmentation equilibrium implies that the ﬂow of
workers out of unemployment equals the ﬂow into unemployment.
For A-type workers:
h(θ)ηu = λ(p +( 1− p)φ)(µ − ηu) (18)
For B-type workers:
h(θ)(1− η)u = λ(1 − µ − (1 − η)u) (19)














λ(p +( 1− p)φ)µ
λ(p +( 1− p)φ)+h(θ)
(21)
Therefore, a segmentation equilibrium is a vector of endogenous variables
{θ∗,u ∗,η∗}, satisfying conditions (17), (20) and (21), that is, the free entry
condition and the two steady state conditions.
To solve for the equilibrium, given our assumptions on m(v,u), (17) has
a unique solution for θ. If we insert this solution on (20) and (21) we geta unique solution for η and u. Therefore, when we have a segmentation
equilibrium, it is unique.
For the existence of a segmentation equilibrium, as it was mentioned
above, it is required that a permanent contract is only proﬁtable with a
A-type worker, that is,
SBP <f<S AP (22)
>From (11) and (12), we obtain that (22) holds when:










r + λ + βh(θ)
y ++ φf (24)
There exists a threshold productivity level, y, such that a permanent
contract is only proﬁtable when the productivity of a worker exceeds this
value. In a segmentation equilibrium this is the case only for a A-type
worker. If we look at the components of the threshold productivity level,
y,t h eﬁrst two account for the outside option of the worker and the set up
costs, and the third one for the ﬁring costs.
Therefore, a worker gets permanency only if the productivity of the
match exceeds the worker’s outside option (the sum of the value of being
unemployed and hired under a temporary job in another ﬁrm), the set up
costs and the ﬁring costs.
3.3 Comparative statics
The higher y, the more diﬃcult for B-type workers to get permanency.


























(r + λ + βh(θ))
2 (y − z − rc) > 0 if y>z+ rc
An increase of the unemployment beneﬁts (z), ﬁring costs (f), destruc-
tion rate of permanent contracts (φ), the set up costs (c)a n dt h ew o r k e r s ’
bargaining power (as long as y>z +rc)( β), raise the threshold productivity
level, y, and, therefore it makes more diﬃcult for L-type workers to obtain
a permanent job.







)( r) and the destruction rate of temporary contracts




βh(θ)(z + rc− y)

















βh(θ)(z + rc− y)
(r + λ + βh(θ))
2 < 0 if y>z+ rc
Summing up, in this section we conclude that getting a permanent con-
tract depends basically on workers characteristics (A-type or B-type work-
ers). Moreover, other factors such as institutional and economic factors
(ﬁring costs, unemployment beneﬁts, destruction rate of permanent and
temporary contracts, bargaining power of workers) and ﬁrms characteristics
(set up costs) are also relevant.4 The Empirical Results
Our model predicts the existence in this system of two opposite dynamics of
workers. For some workers, temporary jobs act as a stepping stone to per-
manent jobs, whereas other type of workers get stuck in temporary jobs. In
this section, we test this prediction by analyzing the transition of temporary
workers to other states using duration models focusing on Spain. A study of
Spain is especially compelling. First, as in the theoretical model, the Span-
ish labor market is a "two-tier system" (see next subsection), in which ﬁring
costs only apply to the termination of permanent contracts. Secondly, Spain
provides a fascinating case of study since the share of temporary contracts
not only is the highest in the OECD but also remains highly persistent above
30 per cent since the last decade. Finally, the dataset we use, the ECHP has
a panel structure and contains abundant information on workers’ transitions
across labor market states and the type of contract held.
Our empirical strategy is to analyze the transitions from temporary to
permanency, to unemployment and to temporary to other ﬁrm by means of
a "competing-risks model". This allows not only to test the model but also
to detect which workers are preferred by ﬁrms.
We move on to describe institutional background and the data and vari-
ables used in our analysis. Next, we present the econometric model that ﬁts
the structure of the data. Finally, we provide the estimation results.
4.1 The institutional background
Spanish legislation on labor contracts is contained in the Workers ‘Statute
of 1980 (Estatuto de los Trabajadores). This law when it was created con-
sidered indeﬁnite contracts as the general case, whereas temporal contracts
were intended to be used only for jobs whose nature was temporary (seasonal
jobs, temporal substitution of permanent workers, etc).
Later on, it has been modiﬁed four times with the 1984, 1994, 1997 and
2001 reforms.
The reform of 1984 introduced ﬂexibility7 establishing that it is no longer
necessary that the activity associated to the job is of temporary nature.
These contracts can be signed for a period between a minimum of six months
and a maximum of three years. After three years, the contract cannot
be renewed and the worker must be either ﬁred. or oﬀered a permanent
contract. In the former case, the ﬁrm cannot employ another worker for this
job. In the case the dismissal is considered ”fair” by a judge, the worker
7For more details, see Toharia and Malo (1999).receives the wage of 20 days per year of seniority. If considered ”unfaired”
by the judge, the worker receives the wage of 45 days per year of seniority
for at least one year.
The 1994 and 1997 reforms, promoted permanent contracts by reducing
their ﬁring costs. In the 1994 reform it was almost eliminated the the gen-
eral applicability of temporary contracts (only was mantained for workers
older than 45, disabled and long-term unemployed). and, moreover, ﬁring
legislation was modiﬁed to reduce the ﬁring costs. The 1997 reform created
a new type of permanent contract, with lower severance costs in case of un-
fair dismissal (33 days wage per year) and with ﬁscal incentives in the ﬁrst
two years of the contract(reductions of employers’ payroll taxes).
Finally, the 2001 reform extended the use of the new type of permanent
contracts created in the 1997 reform and extended their use to other groups
of workers. It was also introduced a severance payment of 8 days’ wages per
year of seniority in temporary contracts not renewed.
4.2 Data and variables.
The data used in our analysis is drawn from the ﬁve ﬁrst waves of ECHP.
Since 1994, the ECHP has been designed to compare diﬀerent aspects of Eu-
ropean countries and annually interviews a representative sample of 80.000
households, of which 8.000 are Spanish. The same individuals are reinter-
viewed each successive year, and if they leave their original households to
form a new one, all adults’ members of these new households are also in-
terviewed. Similarly, children in original households are interviewed when
they are sixteen. The sample remains broadly representative of the Spanish
population.
At each date of interview, all respondents are asked detailed questions
related to their current employment status (kind of contract occupation,
size of ﬁrm) regarding household composition, individual demographics and
income. Respondents are also asked about other labor experience and un-
employment experience in the previous ﬁve years. Particularly, respondents
are asked to recall start date of current job and ﬁnish date of last job, al-
though no contract identiﬁer is supplied. Various related characteristics are
collected for each job spell experience, included type of employment (full-
time, part-time), type of contract (permanent, ﬁxed-term contract, casual
work and other arrangement), occupation and industry.
The data allow us to distinguish three types of temporary contracts,
but we have collapsed this information in a simple category since we are
interested in the transitions and we have not enough observations to analyzethem in a more disaggregated manner.
In order to test the main prediction of the theoretical model, we are
interested both in analyzing the determinants of transitions from temporary
work to other states and how long do temporary contracts last. For these
purposes, we select only those individuals who had a temporary contract at
least once in the period analysed8.
The duration of each spell is constructed using information of the indi-
vidual questionary from the successive waves. Spell duration is deﬁned as
months in the same job with the same employer and not involving a promo-
tion in a permanent position. To each job spell we have attached a vector of
demographic, household, job related and local labor market conditions, and
the details of previous labor market status. Some problems arise since both
the information is annual and no contract identiﬁer is supplied. Therefore,
in order to follow the temporary contract and to determine the spell dura-
tion we rely on the information concerning to the type of contract held and
main activity. Moreover, we can determine the start (last) date of the spell
using the variable, month starting the current job (month ﬁnishing the last
job).
We are also interested in where workers go at the conclusion of a tem-
porary job. The data allow us to distinguish among four states: a) having
a permanent position (regardless of the ﬁrm)9 b) unemployment 10 c) other
states as inactivity or working with an employer in training d) temporary
contract in other ﬁrm. As no direct information is provided, we follow the
variable year starting the current job and year ﬁnishing last job during dif-
ferent waves in order to obtain if the individual switches the ﬁrm. Finally,
if the worker is last observed holding the temporary contract in the last
interview, we consider the spell right-censored11.
The transition to permanency allows us to test the stepping-stone hy-
pothesis. By contrast, other transitions will be useful to contrast whether
some temporary contracts are dead-end jobs by themselves.
The ﬁnal sample yields 4126 spells. Jobs that start prior to the wave one
are discarded, since we have not information about start date and duration.
8Because of data constraints, we focus on people who are working with an employer in
paid employment more than ﬁfteen hours a week.
9When the individual obtains a permanent position in the same ﬁrm we have no infor-
mation about the timing. We assume that in this case the spell ﬁnishes in December.
10In order to deﬁne this state we use LFS classiﬁcation.
11A lot of information gaps can be ﬁlled (individuals who appear and disappear in the
sample following the variable year starting the current job is the same). In these case, we
assume that the variable marital status, and educational level are invariant.We also drop some spells because we have missing information about the
elapsed duration. Finally, we have deleted 946 spells. Table 1 provides some
descriptive statistics of the duration data for the four transitions. Transi-
tions to other states are less relevant because we have a small number of
spells (157). Moreover, it shows that for some individuals there are multiple
observations. Since in the econometric model we assume independence be-
tween spells, we only use this information to estimate the standard errors.
It is also interesting to note that only a 13,08 % of temporary contracts
end in a permanent position. By contrast, a 18,73 % of the contracts go to
unemployment.
Figure 1 depicts the estimated Kaplan-Meier survivor functions for the
four transitions. The survivor function from temporary work to perma-
nent contract (Figure 1a ) strongly declines at 6-12 month. Moreover, there
is another change at 24 months. By contrast, the survivor function from
temporary work to unemployment (Figure 1b) declines strongly until 12
months and later declines at a constant rate. The performance of the sur-
vivor function from temporary to another ﬁrm (Figure 1d) is similar to the
former transition, although the estimated survivor function experimented a
stronger declining at 6-12 months.
The variables used are described here (Table 1A of the Appendix) reports
a complete deﬁnition of all variables). Table 2 reports some descriptive
statistics of our sample.
Individual controls
These variables are used in order to test the hypothesis of the theoretical
model and, therefore, they will be used to identify which workers make
integrate transitions.
Age, sex and marital status are used in order to establish if the transitions
are function of demographic characteristics. We use a dummy for sex, three
dummies for age and two dummies for marital status. Education levels were
included as categorical variables. We use two dummies in order to measure
the level of education. These variables allow us to establish whether more
educated workers are more likely to make transitions to permanency and
less likely to go to "negative states".
Occupational level is included to characterize variations in transitions
among diﬀerent grades of workers. For this reason, nine dummies for occu-
pation are used. Some variables measuring previous labor market attach-
ment are introduced to identify the impact of previous unemployment on
future transitions. More speciﬁcally, we include a set of dummies reﬂecting
whether the individual has been long term unemployed, whether the individ-
ual has worked before in a diﬀerent ﬁrm and a continuous variable reﬂectingthe number of times the individual has been unemployed.
Demand-side variables
In order to control also the demand-side variables, we introduce some
industrial controls. We use four dummies reﬂecting size of the ﬁrm, sector
dummies (six), a dummy to indicate if the individual works in the public sec-
tor and if the individual is a part-time worker. Finally, we include dummies
of industry (nine).
Long-term diﬀerences between regions are controlled using six regional
dummies. Short-term macroeconomics variations were controlled for through
the introduction of a variable measuring the time-varying unemployment
rate disaggregated by sex and area (see Graph 1A in the Appendix).
4.3 The Econometric Model.
Denote t as duration of interest (say, the time a temporary worker remains
in the same contract) by the continuous random variable t, let x(t)ac o l u m n
vector of time-invariant and time-variant regressors to which is associated
a column vector of parameters β. The time-variant regressors contained in
x(t) are age, changes in marital status and current unemployment rate dis-
aggregated by sex and the time-invariant regressors are sex, occupation,
educational attainment and past labor market experiences. The (instanta-
neous) hazard function for each individual (spell) i is assumed to take the
proportional hazard form:
θi(t | x)=Ψ(t)exp(β xi(t)) (25)
where Ψ(t) is the unknown baseline hazard. The associated survivor function
is given by the probability of survivor in a determinate state and can be
expressed as:
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[lnS(ti)]where ci is a censored indicator that is 1 if the spell is completed and
zero otherwise. In our approach, the baseline hazard is not restricted to
any parametric speciﬁcation in order to avoid the potential biases caused by
mis-speciﬁcation of parametric baseline (Meyer (1990)).
The model outlined speciﬁes the determinants of a single risk: leav-
ing a temporary job. But we consider that temporary work can terminate
in alternative states. For this reason, we extend the former model into a
competing risks model framework. Let the indices 1, 2, 3 and 4 denote
the states of ”permanent”, ”unemployment”, ”other states ” and ”other
ﬁrms”, the individual transition rate from temporary to state j is denoted
by θij = Ψ(t)exp(β xij(t)). The survivor function for survival in temporary
work can be expressed as










cij lnθij(ti)+[ l nSi(ti)] (28)
The full log likelihood is given by LnL =
 n
i=1 LnLi. Note that the
likelihood is separable in the hazard (see Lancaster (1990)).
The inclusion of unobserved heterogeneity allows for measurement errors
in the dependent variable as well as omitted unobserved covariates. Let v
be a random variable that has a gamma distribution with variance σ2, then
the hazard rate can be reexpressed as:
θij = Ψ(t) • exp(β xij(t))vij. (29)
We assume that v is independent of t and x(t). However, in a competing
risks framework, allowing for a random disturbance term in each of the
cause-speciﬁc hazards requires an additional assumption that imposes the
independence of these disturbance terms across the cause-speciﬁch a z a r d s 12.
Given this, it is easy to construct a log likelihood function as (28). For more
details, see Han and Hausman (1990) or Lancaster (1990).
12This model can be extended allowing that disturbance among cause-speciﬁc hazard
to be related for a given individual (see van den Berg et al (2002)).The former model identiﬁes three sources of variation among individuals
hazard rates: the elapsed duration of the temporary contracts Ψ(t), the
observable diﬀerences between individuals x(t) and the unobservable ones
(v).
4.4 Results
In this section, we estimate the econometric model described in the former
subsection for the three transitions. Tables 3, 4 and 5 report the estimated
parameters of the covariates for each transition, respectively. In Graph 2, we
show the estimates of the baseline hazard. Moreover, in Tables 6 and 7 we
investigate the transitions for youngsters and women. Finally, in Table 8 we
report the estimates of the parameters of the distribution of unobserved het-
erogeneity and in Table 9 the new estimates taking into account unobserved
heterogeneity.
We specify four models in order to obtain a better understanding of the
relationship between diﬀerent controls and the outcome variable. In model
I, we control for individual characteristics as sex, age, education and occu-
pation. In model II, we include demand-side variables: dummies reﬂecting
size of the ﬁrm, sector dummies, regional controls, a dummy to indicate if
the individual works in the public sector, part-time and, also, local unem-
ployment rates. In model III we drop sector dummies and include dummies
of industry. Finally, in model IV, we drop industry dummies and include
variables related to past labor market history. We fully exploit the time
variation of job tenure by using a monthly measure. We allow the unem-
ployment rate to vary quarterly, the highest frequency available although
the other time-varying regressors take the same values for all months during
each interview.
We ﬁrst examine the transition rate from temporary to permanent. Our
purpose is to investigate whether integrate transitions depend on workers
characteristics. In model I, we observe that educational attainment (both
secondary and terciary education) is very signiﬁcant and positive. Moreover,
we ﬁnd that this kind of transition is more likely to be made by associate
professionals and clerks. By contrast, age and woman are irrelevant.
In model II we control for demand-side variables and we drop profes-
sion dummies in order to avoid correlations between professions and educa-
tion. In this case, we ﬁnd that living in regions with adverse labor market
conditions (south, center or Canaries Island) reduces the chance of exiting
temporary job into permanency. Firm size is also relevant. In this sense,
working in a medium size ﬁrm (20-100) increases the probability of renewalin permanent. It is important to note that when we drop controls for pro-
fession, the transition rate for workers with higher education increases more
than for workers with secondary education. Finally, sector dummies show
that renewal rates into permanency are higher in services.
In model III, we make a further step by using more disaggregated controls
by sectors. We obtain that working in construction reduces the probability
of a permanent renewal, as opposed to working in the retail or transport
sector, where this renewal rate is higher and signiﬁcant.
Finally, in model IV we ﬁnd that workers that have experienced a long-
term unemployment spell and workers who have a history of unemployment
are signiﬁcatively less likely to gain permanency.
Our results suggest that for more educated workers temporary contracts
serve as stepping stone. By contrast, workers who have a "bad history"
seem to get stuck in temporary contracts. Therefore, as it was predicted in
the theoretical model, two opposite dynamics of temporary contracts seem
to emerge.
This is consistent with previous results obtained for Spain. Guell and
Petrongolo (2003), using a sample of temporary workers drawn from the
LFS during the period 1987 to 1996, obtain that education is a strong pre-
dictor although they obtain that being a woman has a negative eﬀect in a
transition rate to permanency. This can be explained because we use a more
disaggregated sample that allows us to use a wide set of controls.
Booth et al (2002), using data from the British Household Panel Sur-
vey, observe that the transition to a permanent position is determined by
a temporal pattern, which has little to do with either observed personal
characteristics and ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristics. Two reasons can explain
these diﬀerences. They use diﬀerent deﬁnitions of temporary work: causal,
seasonal and ﬁxed-term contracts. Moreover, it can be explained by the
diﬀerent role that temporary contracts have played in the UK labor market
(they are only 10 per cent of the contracts and this rate keeps constant over
time).
Next, we analyze the transition from temporary jobs to unemployment.
This transition serves to test whether temporary contracts represent for
some workers dead-end jobs.
In model I, we observe that either young people (between 16-25) and
workers who are between 46-65 are more likely to exit into unemployment.
These results remain for any controls we include. We also obtain that this
probability is higher for females than males. As opposed to the former
transition, both higher education and w o r k i n gi na na s s o c i a t ep r o f e s s i o n
aﬀect negatively to this transition. These results reinforce the role playedby these variables in the transition into permanency. By contrast, secondary
education is irrelevant.
In model II we introduce demand-side variables. We obtain that region
of residence has a signiﬁcant impact on the exit into unemployment. Sector
eﬀects also emerge in the data. Individuals employed in agriculture have the
highest probability of ending in unemployment.
Public sector workers have higher rates of exit into unemployment than
those in the private sector. This result is consistent with Dolado et al (2002).
They ﬁnd that the public sector has increased a lot the proportion of tem-
porary hires for this period due to the ﬁscal consolidation pursued by the
Spanish government after the Maastricht Treaty. This change in the hiring
behavior of the public sector has also been reﬂected in a higher exit of public
workers into unemployment.
Part-time workers have also higher transition rates into unemployment.
Finally, local unemployment rate has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on this
transition as opposed to the transition into permanency where this variable
is irrelevant.
I nm o d e lI I I ,w eﬁnd that a number of industry eﬀects emerge in the data.
Individuals employed in agriculture, construction, health service, education
and social work have the highest transition rates into unemployment. The
number of times a worker has been unemployed has also a positive and
signiﬁcant eﬀect. Therefore, there is some evidence of a causal relationship
between past and present labor market experiences.
Finally, in model IV we observe that previous labor market experience
increases the transition rate into unemployment. Workers who have expe-
rienced long-term unemployment spells have a higher probability of ending
in unemployment.
These results suggest that workers’ characteristics play a key role in
the transition to unemployment. In this sense, young workers, women, less
educated workers and "bad history" workers seem to experiment a penalty.
Therefore, for these groups of workers temporary contracts seem to be dead-
e n dj o b s ,w h i c hi sc o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h er e s u l t so b t a i n e di nt h ef o r m e rt r a n s i -
tion, that is, there exist two opposite dynamics of temporary contracts.
Finally, we analyze the exit from temporary work to work in another
ﬁrm. This transition closes the gap, allowing us to study in a complete
manner the "dead-end" hypothesis. We observe that educational attain-
ment plays an important role. In this sense, possessing a university degree
aﬀects negatively the probability of switching from one temporary job to an-
other. Size ﬁrm and industry eﬀects are relevant. More speciﬁcally, working
in a medium size ﬁrm and in the agricultural sector increases the proba-bility of this transition. By contrast, working in the service sector aﬀects
in the opposite way. The number of times a worker has been unemployed
and experience in another ﬁrm have also a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect.
These results reinforce the existence of a "precariousness" trap, in the sense
that those workers having a temporary contract in the past or experiencing
unemployment spells, have a lower probability of ﬁnding a permanent job.
Tables 6 and 7 show the results from performing the model IV only for
women and youngsters, respectively.
The results of Table 6 show that women have a strong probability to
make integrate transitions to permanency if they work in small and medium
size ﬁrm. Also, it is interesting to observe that the coeﬃcient of part-time
is quite larger for women in the transition to unemployment and to another
ﬁrm than when we pool the sample. Finally, in Table 7, we observe that
young educated people are more likely to obtain a permanent position than
older ones.
In order to test "screening device hypothesis" we introduce unobserved
heterogeneity. Table 8 shows the estimates for unobserved heterogeneity
distribution for model IV of each transition. More speciﬁcally, it presents the
estimates of ln(σ2) and also the likelihood ratio test (LR) to test model with
unobserved heterogeneity versus model without unobserved heterogeneity.
For the transition into permanent, both LR and estimates of ln(σ2) indicate
that there is no evidence of individuals unobservables in this transition.
By contrast, we observe the existence of unobserved heterogeneity in the
transition into unemployment and in the transition to another ﬁrm.
Our results indicate that the transition into permanency depends ex-
clusively on the observed characteristics of workers (education, past labor
history, etc), which suggests that temporary contracts are not used as a
"screening device", that is, conversion into permanency does not depend on
unobservable characteristics of individuals (ability, preferences, etc).
Table 9 displays the estimates of these transitions taking into account
unobserved heterogeneity for speciﬁcation IV. For both transitions we obtain
similar results that in the previous models without unobserved heterogeneity.
However, for transition into unemployment we observe that with unobserved
heterogeneity the estimates are quite larger indicating some biases in the
estimates. In this sense, it is important to note that for the former transition
both part-time and long term unemployment play a more important role.
Finally, we present additional results to understand in a complete man-
ner the dynamics of the transitions presented above. Figure 2 displays the
baseline hazard estimates of model IV for exits from temporary jobs to the
four transitions. The ﬁgure shows a sharply diﬀerent pattern between thetemporary to permanent baseline hazard estimates and the temporary to
unemployment one. In the former, we observe sharp spikes at durations
around one, two and three years. By contrast, in the latter we observe a
rising baseline hazard with a small spike at around the ﬁrst year, followed
by a longer decrease with small spikes until the second year. Finally, in the
third year the baseline hazard shortly increases.
This evidence on the baseline hazard may suggest that there exist strong
cyclical patterns in exits from temporary work to unemployment and much
weaker (or nonexistent) cyclically in exits to permanent. Secondly, the fact
that exits to permanent concentrate at around the twelfth, twenty-fourth
and thirty-sixth months indicate that employers wait until the expiration
of the temporary contract to proceed to the permanent renewal. Besides,
exits to permanency are virtually zero in the ﬁrst months of a temporary
contract.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have developed a matching model in a labor market with
heterogeneous workers and symmetric information in which segmentation
arises endogenously from the heterogeneity of workers, that is, two opposite
dynamics emerge: for some type of workers temporary jobs act as stepping
stones to permanent jobs, whereas other type of workers get stuck in tem-
porary jobs. Besides, the model suggests that temporary contracts can by
used by ﬁrms as a waiting device until the ﬁrm is matched with some spe-
ciﬁct y p eo fw o r k e ra n dt h em a t c ht u r n so u tt ob eg o o d . N o t i c et h a tt h i s
is another alternative use of temporary contracts apart from the classical
"screening device" or the "cheaper option".
The second part of the paper contains evidence of two opposite dynamics
for diﬀerent type of workers. The empirical analysis has focused on Spain,
that provides an interesting case of study with a "two-tier" labor market
and a share of temporary contracts, which not only is the highest but also
remains highly persistent above 30 per cent since the last decade. Our results
show that for more educated workers temporary contracts serve as stepping
stone. By contrast, workers who have a ”bad history” seem to get stuck in
temporary contracts. Moreover, workers’ characteristics play a key role in
the transition to unemployment. In this sense, young workers, women, less
educated workers and ”bad history” workers seem to experiment a penalty.
Therefore, for these groups of workers temporary contracts seem to be dead-
end jobs.Finally, we test the ”screening device hypothesis” by introducing unob-
served heterogeneity. Our results indicate that the transition into perma-
nency depends exclusively on the observed characteristics of workers (edu-
cation, past labor history, etc.), which suggests that temporary contracts
are not used as a ”screening device”, that is, conversion into permanency
does not depend on unobservable characteristics of individuals (ability, pref-
erences, etc.).
The evidence presented in this paper has policy implications. The ex-
istence of two opposite dynamics for diﬀerent type of workers implies a
diﬀerent use of temporary contracts. Therefore, in the design of any labor
market policy, it should be taken into account that any general policy will
have diﬀerent (even opposed) eﬀects for diﬀerent type of workers. By con-
trast, policies targeted to speciﬁc group of workers should take into account
the channels through which the "precariousness trap" emerge.
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Summary statistics of durations. 
 
Number of individuals  3130 
Number of spells  4126 
Average duration of temporary to permanent 
transitions*. 
17,04 
Average duration of temporary to unemployment 
transitions*. 
16,35 
Average duration of temporary to other states 
transitions*. 
15,61 
Average duration of temporary to other temporary 
in other firm transitions. 
16,39 
Average duration of uncompleted spells.   11,10 
Number of spells censored.  1998 
Number of spells that end in a permanent job.  540 
Number of spells that end in  
Unemployment.  
773 
Number of spells that end in  
other states. 
157 
Number of spells that end in a temporary contract in 
another firm. 
658 
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Figure 1d. Temporary into moving in other firms
Kaplan-Meier survival estimate
Figure 1. Kaplan Meier Survival Estimates 
Table 2. 
Sample characteristics of the temporary 
workers. 
 Means 
Aged between 16 and 25  0.314 
Aged between 26 and 34  0.405 
Aged between 35 and 46   0.200 
Aged between 47 and 65  0.136 
   
woman  0.387 
   
Married or cohabiting    0.500 
Other States  0.035 
Single  0.463 
   
Part-time  0.117 
Public sector  0.122 
  
   
Size1-5   0.243 
Size 5-20  0.277 
Size 20-50  0.161 
Size 51-99  0.082 
Size 100-500  0.089 
Size 500+  0.059 
   
Agricultural   0.066 
Industry  0.378 
Services  0.534 
   
Primary  0.066 
Energy  0.010 
Manufacturing  0.163 
Construction  0.182 
Wholesale  0.132 
Hotels and restaurants  0.072 
Transport  0.066 
Banking  0.066 
Local Public sector  0.042 
Education, health and social 
services. 
0.066 
Higher qualification  0.193 
Secondary qualification  0.204 
Some qualification  0.601 
Unemployment spells longer 
than 1 year. 
0.339 
Number of times 
unemployed 
0.793 
Experience in another firm  0.780 
Northeast   0.125 
Northwest  0.142 
Madrid   0.079 
Center  0.145 
East  0.224 










 Table 3. 
Exits from temporary to permanency 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV 
Aged between 16 and 25  0.093 0.060  0.034  0.041 
  (0.77) (0.48)  (0.27)  (0.33) 
Aged between 26 and 35   0.053 0.049  0.017  0.070 
  (0.50) (0.46)  (0.16)  (0.66) 
Aged between 47 and 65  -0.155 -0.171  -0.177  -0.189 
  (0.93) (1.02)  (1.07)  (1.14) 
Other States  -0.407 -0.545+  -0.544+  -0.506 
  (1.27) (1.75)  (1.68)  (1.56) 
Single  -0.039 -0.068  -0.082  -0.036 
  (0.38) (0.63)  (0.78)  (0.35) 
woman  -0.041 -0.084  -0.121  -0.063 
  (0.41) (0.85)  (1.22)  (0.62) 
Higher qualification  0.282** 0.360***  0.347***  0.345*** 
  (2.15) (3.05)  (3.02)  (2.94) 
Secondary qualification  0.236** 0.277**  0.217**  0.257** 
  (2.16) (2.51)  (2.03)  (2.42) 
Managerial  0.471      
  (1.24)      
Professional   0.223      
  (0.89)      
Teachers and others  -0.014      
  (0.06)      
Associate Professional  0.296      
  (1.01)      
Associate Teachers  0.545***      
  (3.02)      
Clerks  0.306+      
  (1.93)      
Protection, personal services 
and sales. 
0.145      
  (1.11)      
Semi-skilled workers  -0.274      
  (0.73)      
Miscellaneous  -0.372***      
  (2.83)      
Northeast    -0.246  -0.237  -0.214 
   (1.42)  (1.32)  (1.22) 
Northwest   -0.172  -0.200  -0.166 
   (1.06)  (1.22)  (1.04) 
Centre   -0.689*** -0.658*** -0.663*** 
   (3.84)  (3.57)  (3.68) 
East   -0.163  -0.184  -0.139 
   (1.09)  (1.22)  (0.95) 
South   -0.790*** -0.761*** -0.728*** 
   (4.53)  (4.21)  (4.07) 
Canarias   -0.626*** -0.561** -0.593*** 
   (3.02)  (2.55)  (2.75) 
Size1-5    0.149  0.173  0.146 
   (0.91)  (1.08)  (0.88) 
Size5-20   0.280+  0.316**  0.284+ 
   (1.80)  (2.05)  (1.82) 
Size20-50   0.121  0.133  0.122 
   (0.71)  (0.80)  (0.72) 
Size51-99   0.368+  0.392** 0.385** 
   (1.93)  (2.03)  (1.99)  
Size100-500   0.126  0.105  0.118 
   (0.67)  (0.56)  (0.63) 
Agricultural    0.210    0.183 
   (0.95)    (0.81) 
Services   0.382***    0.381*** 
   (3.63)    (3.52) 
Part-time   -0.178    -0.154 
   (1.14)    (1.01) 
Public sector   -0.228    -0.203 
   (1.52)    (1.34) 
Local unemployment rate   -0.004  0.001  -0.002 
   (0.19)  (0.03)  (0.09) 
Unemployment spells        -0.179+ 
longer than 1 year.       (1.80) 
Number of times       -0.141** 
unemployed       (2.05) 
Experience in another        0.171 
firm       (1.35) 
Primary     -0.114   
     (0.49)  
Energy     -0.059   
     (0.15)  
Construction    -0.743***  
     (4.42)  
Wholesale     0.254+  
     (1.75)  
Hotels and restaurants     -0.122   
     (0.72)  
Transport    0.483***  
     (2.67)  
Banking     -0.013   
     (0.07)  
Local Public sector     -0.351   
     (1.28)  
Education, health and      -0.084   
social services.     (0.57)  
Person-month observations  58212 58212  58212  58212 
Note: Obtained using semi-parametric proportional hazard models. The sample used is sample 2. Robust z statistics in parentheses. 
The robust standard errors allow for clustering by individual. + Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Table 4. 
Exit from temporary work to unemployment. 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV 
Aged between 16 and 25  0.278*** 0.293***  0.323***  0.310*** 
  (2.63) (7.46)  (3.06)  (2.89) 
Aged between 26 and 35   -0.059 -0.047  -0.036  -0.071 
  (0.65) (1.40)  (0.40)  (0.79) 
Aged between 47 and 65  0.291** 0.285***  0.285**  0.306*** 
  (2.46) (6.42)  (2.39)  (2.63) 
Other States  0.090 0.055  0.057  -0.017 
  (0.55) (0.82)  (0.34)  (0.10) 
Single  -0.093 -0.088**  -0.090  -0.133 
  (0.99) (2.50)  (0.94)  (1.38) 
woman  0.332*** 0.271***  0.332***  0.235*** 
  (3.98) (8.75)  (3.83)  (2.81) 
Higher qualification  0.482*** -0.529***  -0.537***  -0.500*** 
  (3.27) (11.64)  (4.20)  (3.83) 
Secondary qualification  -0.013 -0.024  -0.016  0.008 
  (0.14) (0.68)  (0.17)  (0.08) 
Managerial  -0.061      
  (0.12)      
Professional   0.107      
  (0.35)      
Teachers and others  0.033      
  (0.12)      
Associate Professional  -0.031      
  (0.09)      
Associate Teachers  -0.657**      
  (2.20)      
Clerks  0.035      
  (0.22)      
Protection, personal services and 
sales. 
0.059      
  (0.54)      
Semi-skilled workers  0.381+      
  (1.67)      
Miscellaneous  0.136      
  (1.43)      
Northeast    0.405***  0.381**  0.375** 
   (5.97)  (2.04)  (2.05) 
Northwest   0.325***  0.333+  0.334+ 
   (4.78)  (1.73)  (1.75) 
Centre   0.374***  0.354+  0.363** 
   (5.72)  (1.91)  (1.99) 
East   0.305***  0.312+  0.282 
   (4.84)  (1.77)  (1.62) 
South   0.507***  0.497***  0.431** 
   (8.12)  (2.82)  (2.49) 
Canarias   0.155**  0.116  0.098 
   (2.07)  (0.55)  (0.48) 
Size1-5    0.251***  0.252+  0.258+ 
   (5.02)  (1.94)  (1.92) 
Size5-20   0.217***  0.214+  0.224+ 
   (4.47)  (1.68)  (1.74) 
Size20-50   -0.009  -0.004  0.004 
   (0.17)  (0.03)  (0.02) 
Size51-99   0.105  0.109  0.115 
   (1.62)  (0.64)  (0.66)  
Size 100-500   0.223***  0.266+  0.248 
   (3.81)  (1.72)  (1.61) 
Agricultural    0.165***    0.241 
   (3.03)    (1.64) 
Services   0.006    -0.003 
   (0.19)    (0.03) 
Part-time   0.368***    0.334*** 
   (9.55)    (3.32) 
Public sector   0.308***    0.271** 
   (7.05)    (2.26) 
Local unemployment rate   0.026***  0.024  0.031 
   (2.84)  (0.89)  (1.12) 
Unemployment spells        0.394*** 
longer than 1 year.       (5.10) 
Number of times        0.101+ 
unemployed       (1.87) 
Experience in another        -0.177+ 
firm       (1.65) 
Primary     0.364**   
     (2.21)  
Energy     0.120   
     (0.35)  
Construction     0.266**   
     (2.02)  
Wholesale     -0.070   
     (0.47)  
Hotels and restaurants     0.228   
     (1.58)  
Transport     0.324   
     (1.64)  
Banking     0.090   
     (0.47)  
Local Public sector     0.600***  
     (3.39)  
Education, health and      0.419***  
social services.     (3.11)  
Person-month observations  58212 58212  58212  58212 
Note: Obtained using semi-parametric proportional hazard models. The sample used is sample 2. The robust standard errors allow 





























Exit form from temporary work to work in other firm. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV 
Aged between 16 and 2 0.101 0.090**  0.079 0.183 
  (0.85) (2.08) (0.68) (1.56) 
Aged between 26 and 3 -0.172 -0.173***  -0.174+  -0.197+ 
  (1.63) (4.70) (1.68) (1.93) 
Aged between 47 and 6 -0.156 -0.188***  -0.172 -0.171 
  (0.98) (3.62) (1.10) (1.10) 
Other States  -0.072 0.028  0.052  0.012 
  (0.30) (0.32) (0.22) (0.05) 
Single  0.028 0.093**  0.112 0.131 
  (0.27) (2.43) (1.09) (1.30) 
woman  -0.058 -0.001 0.082  0.031 
  (0.55) (0.04) (0.79) (0.30) 
Higher qualification  -0.378*** -0.507*** -0.465*** -0.448*** 
  (2.58) (9.97) (3.30) (3.21) 
Secondary qualification-0.107 -0.127***  -0.112 -0.076 
  (0.93) (3.20) (0.98) (0.66) 
Managerial  -1.982+      
  (1.93)      
Professional   -0.011      
  (0.03)      
Teachers and others  -0.274      
  (0.96)      
Associate Professional  0.072      
  (0.23)      
Associate Teachers  -0.302      
  (1.14)      
Clerks  -0.209      
  (1.04)      
Protection, personal ser
and sales. 
-0.098      
  (0.71)      
Semi-skilled workers  0.044      
  (0.17)      
Miscellaneous  0.268**      
  (2.53)      
Northeast    -0.143**  -0.084  -0.106 
   (2.07)  (0.42)  (0.54) 
Northwest   -0.155**  -0.118  -0.130 
   (2.31)  (0.62)  (0.69) 
Centre   -0.232***  -0.193  -0.243 
   (3.57)  (1.03)  (1.30) 
East   -0.241***  -0.214  -0.231 
   (3.90)  (1.18)  (1.28) 
South   -0.081  -0.044  -0.097 
   (1.32)  (0.25)  (0.54) 
Canarias   0.250***  0.231  0.272 
   (3.69)  (1.17)  (1.40) 
Size1-5    -0.038  -0.039  -0.005 
   (0.66)  (0.25)  (0.03) 
Size5-20   0.221***  0.178  0.220 
   (4.14)  (1.22)  (1.52) 
Size20-50   0.303***  0.286+  0.307** 
   (5.36)  (1.87)  (2.02) 
Size51-99   0.094  0.074  0.077 
   (1.34)  (0.41)  (0.42) 
       
Size100-500   0.014  -0.012  0.004 
   (0.20)  (0.07)  (0.02) 
Agricultural   0.373***    0.337** 
   (6.88)   (2.18) 
Services   -0.203***   -0.183+ 
   (5.58)   (1.82) 
Part-time   0.163***   0.193 
   (3.25)   (1.47) 
Public sector   0.031   0.032 
   (0.60)   (0.21) 
Local unemployment rate   0.034***  0.033+  0.030 
   (4.26)  (1.65)  (1.48) 
Unemployment spells      -0.086 
longer than 1 year.     (0.94) 
Number of times      0.178*** 
unemployed     (3.16) 
Experience in another      0.302** 
firm     (2.24) 
Primary    0.449***   
    (2.68)   
Energy    -0.095   
    (0.24)   
Construction    0.140   
    (1.07)   
Wholesale    -0.223   
    (1.40)   
Hotels and restaurants    0.129   
    (0.84)   
Transport    -0.098   
    (0.43)   
Banking    0.089   
    (0.48)   
Local Public sector    -0.139   
    (0.55)   
Education, health and     -0.425**   
social services.    (2.43)   
Person-month  
observations. 
58212 58212 58212 58212 
Note: Obtained using semi-parametric proportional hazard models. The sample used is sample 2. Robust z statistics in 
parentheses clustered by individuals. + Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Table 6. 
 Transition from temporary job. Women 
 Permanent  Unemployment  Other  firms 
Aged between 16 and 25  0.033 0.359**  0.366+ 
  (0.17) (2.24)  (1.94) 
Aged between 26 and 35   0.138 -0.003  -0.199 
  (0.80) (0.03)  (1.11) 
Aged between 47 and 65  0.046 0.318  -0.213 
 (0.15)  (1.57)  (0.62) 
Other States  -0.895+ -0.022  -0.038 
  (1.88) (0.11)  (0.11) 
Single  0.106 -0.344**  0.299+ 
 (0.64)  (2.39)  (1.74) 
Northeast   -0.569+ 0.359  -0.383 
  (1.92) (1.42)  (1.14) 
Northwest  -0.187 0.287  -0.203 
  (0.74) (1.07)  (0.67) 
Centre  -0.741** 0.448+  -0.251 
  (2.34) (1.68)  (0.76) 
East  -0.196 0.290  -0.221 
  (0.87) (1.21)  (0.79) 
South  -1.212*** 0.383  -0.215 
  (3.77) (1.53)  (0.69) 
Canarian  -0.842** 0.300  0.428 
 (2.33)  (1.08)  (1.38) 
Size 1-5   0.360 0.248  -0.389 
  (1.26) (1.28)  (1.38) 
Size 5-20  0.731*** 0.019  -0.056 
  (2.66) (0.09)  (0.21) 
Size 20-50  0.673** -0.385  0.342 
  (2.48) (1.57)  (1.40) 
Size 51-99  0.441 0.105  -0.145 
  (1.25) (0.41)  (0.45) 
Size 100-500  0.224 0.171  -0.050 
 (0.70)  (0.74)  (0.16) 
Part-time  -0.016 0.329**  0.526*** 
  (0.08) (2.57)  (3.08) 
Public sector  -0.020 0.115  -0.092 
 (0.09)  (0.66)  (0.35) 
Agricultural   0.627 -0.025  -0.251 
  (1.27) (0.07)  (0.62) 
Services  -0.053 0.023  -0.352+ 
  (0.27) (0.14)  (1.93) 
Higher qualification  0.189 -0.520*** -0.416** 
  (1.04) (3.11)  (2.15) 
Secondary qualification  0.208 0.084  -0.152 
 (1.25)  (0.64)  (0.76) 
Unemployment spells   -0.009 0.341***  -0.108 
longer than 1 year.  (0.06) (2.92)  (0.66) 
Number of times   -0.054 0.103  0.134 
unemployed  (0.39) (1.23)  (1.17) 
Experience in another   0.047 -0.191  0.416** 
 (0.25)  (1.26)  (2.10) 
Local unemployment rate  0.019 0.058  -0.004 
 (0.68)  (1.61)  (0.11) 
Observations  20795 20795  20795 
Note: Obtained using semi-parametric proportional hazard models. The sample used is sample 2. Robust z statistics in 











Transition from temporary for youngsters. 
 Permanent  Unemployment  Other  firms 
Northeast   -0.398 0.476+  -0.006 
  (1.34) (1.67) (0.02) 
Northwest  -0.495+ 0.451  0.300 
  (1.79) (1.52) (1.02) 
Centre  -0.724** 0.560**  -0.105 
  (2.40) (2.00) (0.36) 
East  -0.240 0.431  0.098 
  (1.01) (1.62) (0.36) 
South  -1.242*** 0.404  -0.112 
  (3.73) (1.50) (0.38) 
Canarian  -0.853+ 0.520+  0.337 
 (1.96)  (1.74)  (1.10) 
Size 1-5   -0.169 0.275  0.036 
  (0.60) (1.24) (0.16) 
Size 5-20  -0.028 0.106  0.003 
  (0.11) (0.48) (0.01) 
Size 20-50  -0.038 0.071  0.133 
  (0.12) (0.29) (0.54) 
Size 51-99  0.385 0.127 -0.296 
  (1.32) (0.47) (1.00) 
Size 100-500  0.062 0.288 -0.052 
 (0.19)  (1.13)  (0.18) 
Part-time  -0.339 0.390**  0.337+ 
  (1.26) (2.48) (1.79) 
Public sector  -0.603 0.360**  -0.077 
 (1.64)  (1.99)  (0.28) 
Agricultural   0.094 0.075 0.596** 
  (0.24) (0.25) (2.35) 
Services  0.043 0.131 -0.016 
  (0.25) (0.95) (0.10) 
Higher qualification  0.510** -0.370+ -0.310 
  (2.55) (1.85) (1.52) 
Secondary qualification  0.209 0.329**  0.018 
 (1.19)  (2.41)  (0.11) 
Unemployment spells   -0.312 0.334**  0.066 
longer than 1 year.  (1.60) (2.50) (0.42) 
Number of times   -0.166 0.184+  0.118 
unemployed  (1.13) (1.77) (0.93) 
Experience in another   0.167 -0.198  0.362** 
 (1.04)  (1.59)  (2.30) 
Local unemployment rate  -0.028 0.051  0.038 
 (0.58)  (1.49)  (1.49) 
Note: Obtained using semi-parametric proportional hazard models. The sample used is sample 2. Robust z statistics in parentheses 
clustered by individuals. + Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.Robust z statistics in parentheses 
     
 
 Table 8. 
Results of estimated heterogeneity distribution 
Temporary to permanent  p-value 
ln(σ
2)  0,0002 0,8926 
Likelihood ratio statistic*   0,0000 0,9950 
Temporary to unemployment   
ln(σ
2)  3,637 0,001 
Likelihood ratio statistic *  19,623 0,000 
Temporary to other transitions   
ln(σ
2)  2,490 0,022 
Likelihood ratio statistic *  10,594 0,001 




Estimation results with unobserved heterogeneity. 
 Transition  into  unemployment Transition  into 
other enterprises 
Aged between 16 and 25  0,452** 0,396** 
  (2,560) (2,410) 
Aged between 26 and 35  -0,280
+ -0,095 
  (-1,870) (-0,710) 
Aged between 47 and 65  -0,061 -0,208 
  (-0,290) (-1,050) 
Other States  0,080 0,296 
  (0,230) (0,930) 
Single  0,060 0,214 
  (0,360) (1,480) 
women  0,544*** 0,005 
  (3,430) (0,030) 
Higher qualification  -0,988*** -0,583*** 
  (-4,440) (-3,080) 
Secondary qualification  -0,173 -0,242 
  (-1,080) (-1,580) 
Size1-5  0,380
+ -0,017 
  (1,690) (-0,080) 
Size5-20  0,346
+ 0,396** 
  (1,650) (2,410) 
Size20-50  -0,066 0,153 
  (-0,290) (0,610) 
Size51-99  0,173 0,069 
  (0,620) (0,290) 
    
Size100-500  -0,067 0,069 
  (-0,260) 0,290 
Agricultural   0,444
+ 0,431** 
  (1,760) (1,980) 
Services  -0,107 -0,306** 
  (-0,710) (-2,23) 
Part-time  0,742*** 0,316
+ 
  (3,750) (1,680) 
Public sector  0,510** -0,159 
  (2,390) (-0,790) 
Local unemployment rate  0,085** 0,046 
  (2,350) (1,500) 
Unemployment spells   0,776
*** 0,025 
longer than 1 year.  (5,110) (0,200) 
Number of times   -0,004 0,142
+ 
unemployed  (-0,050) (1,810) 
Experience in another   -0,127 0,389** 
firm  (-0,700) (2,170) 
Note: Obtained using semi-parametric proportional hazard models. The sample used is sample 2. Robust z statistics in 
parentheses clustered by individuals. Include regional controls+ Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
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Figure 2d: Temporary into other firms 
 Figure 2.  Baseline Hazard EstimatesAPPENDIX 
 
Table 1A. 
Definition of Variables. 
Variable   Definition 
Woman   Sex female 
Age group   
Aged between 16 and 25  Aged between 16 and 25 
Aged between 26 and 34  Aged between 26 and 34 
Aged between 35 and 46 (Reference 
category) 
Aged between 35 and 46 
Aged between 47 and 65  Aged between 47 and 65 
Marital status   
Married or cohabiting  (Reference 
category) 
Married or consensual union at interview date 
Other States  Divorced, widowed or separated at interview date 
Single Single 
 
Part-time  Part-time worker  





Managerial Legislators, senior officials  
Corporate managers  
Managers of small enterprises. 
Professional   Physical, mathematical and engineering science professionals  
Life science and health professionals 
Teachers and others  Teaching professionals and others professionals 
Associate Professional  Physical and engineering science associate professionals  
 Life science and health associate professionals 
Associate Teachers  Teaching associate professionals and other associate professionals 
Clerks  Office clerks and customer services clerks 
Protection, personal services  
and sales. 
Semi-skilled workers 
Personal, protective services workers, 
 Models, salespersons, demonstrators  
Services elementary occupations  
  Skilled agricultural and fishery workers, 
Agricultural, fishery and related labourers 
Unskilled workers 
(Reference category) 
Metal, machinery and related trades workers  
Precision, handicraft, printing and related trades workers 
Stationary-plant and related operators  
 Drivers and mobile-plan operators 
Machine operators and assemblers 
Labourers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport 
Miscellaneous Miscellaneous 
  
Industry (grouped B)   
Primary  Agriculture, hunting and forestry + Fishing 
Energy  Mining and quarrying + Electricity, gas and water supply 
Manufacturing 
 (reference category) 
Manufacture of metal products, machinery and equipments n.e.c. 
  Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco 
Manufacture of textiles, clothing and leather products 
Manufacture off wood and paper products; publishing and printing 
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum/chemicals/rubber & plastic/… 
Other manufacturing 
Construction Construction 
Wholesale  Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and 
personal/household goods 
Hotels and restaurants  Hotels and restaurants 
Transport  Transport, storage and communication 
Banking Financial  intermediation 
Real estate, renting and business activities Local Public Sector  Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 
Education, health and social services.  Education 
Health and social work 
  Other community, social and personal service activities; private 
households with employed persons; extra-territorial organizations and bodies 
Main activity in the current job 
(grouped c) 
 





Firm size   
Size1-5   Firm size: fewer than 5 employees at the establishment 
Size5-20  Firm size: 5-20 employees at the establishment 
Size20-50  Firm size: 20-49- employees at the establishment 
Size51-99  Firm size: 50-99- employees at the establishment 
Size100-500  Firm size: 100-499 employees at the establishment 
Size500+(reference category)  Firm size: +500 employees at the establishment 
  
Educational Attainment   
Higher qualification   Recognised third level education (ISCED 5-7) 
Secondary qualification  Second stage of secondary level education (ISCED 3) 
Some qualification 
 (Reference category) 
Less than second stage of secondary education (ISCED 0-2) 
   
Past jobs   
Experience in another firm  Have work in another place before the current job 
  
Number of times unemployed  Number of times individuals have been unemployed during the five years before 
joining the survey. 
Unemployment spells longer than 1 
year. 
1 if individuals are unemployed for more than a year. 
  
Region  
Northeast   Northeast  
Northwest Northwest 






Local unemployment rate 
Canarias 
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Graphs by region (nuts anonymised)
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Graphs by region (nuts anonymised)
Graph 2. Unemployment rate by area and sex. Women. 1994-1998